





Pompl, S. and Gherghina, S. (2019) Messages and familiar faces: crowdfunding in 
the 2017 U.K. electoral campaign. Politics and Policy, 47(3), pp. 436-463. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article, Pompl, S. and Gherghina, 
S. (2019) Messages and familiar faces: crowdfunding in the 2017 U.K. electoral 
campaign. Politics and Policy, 47(3), pp. 436-463, which has been published in 
final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/polp.12301. This article may be used for 











































MESSAGES AND FAMILIAR FACES:  
Crowdfunding in the 2017 UK electoral campaign 
 




Political crowdfunding is a relatively new process. Research has sought to unveil its functioning 
in particular case studies. However, crowdfunding in electoral campaigns remains largely 
unexplored and little is known about why some candidates are more likely to attain targeted 
donation levels than others. This article addresses this gap in the literature and analyses the 
use of crowdfunding in the 2017 UK General Election campaign. It aims to explain the variation 
in candidates’ ability to reach the proposed targets. The analysis uses original data collected 
from 100 crowdfunding projects, campaign websites and the social media pages of the 
candidates during the campaign. The findings indicate that candidates with an aggressive 
message, who are realistic about their proposed target and who are already in office are more 
likely to gather donations closer to their targets.  
 




Online campaigns are used to reach and mobilise new voter audiences, providing a cheaper 
alternative to traditional methods (Boulianne 2009; Johnston & Pattie 2014). One of the most 
important advantages digital methods lend politicians is the possibility to raise money online. 
Money is essential in elections. Campaigns are expensive and require staff, printing, transport, 
etc. Therefore, money is necessary upfront to ensure broad coverage of a campaign (Hassell 
2011) as well as electoral success. Research has shown a positive correlation between 
campaign spending and share of votes (Milligan & Rekkas 2008). An increasing number of 
campaign websites has already used the option of online funding by including a button for 
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donations. Very recently, crowdfunding has started to make its way into politics. While 
crowdfunding began as a method to finance different types of art, humanitarian or 
entrepreneurial projects, it has become a popular means of collecting money for political 
causes. Considered as a category of fundraising in itself (Mollick 2014), crowdfunding has its 
origins in the concept of crowdsourcing (Zheng et al. 2014). The basic idea behind 
crowdsourcing is to get feedback and ideas from a large group of people. Along these lines, 
crowdfunding may be defined as “an open call, essentially through the Internet, for the 
provision of financial resources either in the form of a donation or in exchange for some 
reward and/or voting rights” (Belleflamme et al. 2013, p.5). Crowdfunding means that 
individual small donors contribute to the electoral campaign, thus allowing politicians either 
to complement the revenues they receive from larger parties or private donors or to run a 
more independent campaign that is not beholden to its larger donors.  
Crowdfunding breaks some of the old patterns of campaign financing (Bennett 2016). 
In spite of its growing popularity, little attention has been dedicated to crowdfunding for 
electoral campaigns. So far research on crowdfunding has focused on issues such as who 
participates, why people donate, how it functions and exploratory studies of crowdfunding 
platforms (Gerber & Hui 2013; Lu et al. 2014; Mollick 2014; Zheng et al. 2014; Stiver et al. 
2015; Dushnitsky et al. 2016; Greenberg & Mollick 2017). Only isolated research has been 
conducted on the uses of crowdfunding in politics and how it functions in particular case 
studies (Sokolov 2015; Jacquet & Reuchamps 2016). The importance of crowdfunding in 
electoral campaigns remains largely unexplored and little is known about why some 
candidates collect more funds than others through crowdfunding. 
To address this gap in the literature, this article analyses the use of crowdfunding by 
candidates and seeks to explain the variation in their ability to reach their desired targets. The 
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research question guiding our analysis is: What determines the achievement of targeted 
amounts during electoral campaigns? Our quest for an answer relies on a combination of 
theories from (offline) electoral campaigning, political communication and fundraising. The 
central argument of our analysis is that candidates with an aggressive message, who are 
realistic about their proposed target and who are in office are more likely to gather donations 
closer to their targets. Our candidate level analysis uses original data collected from 100 
crowdfunding projects, campaign websites and the social media pages of the candidates 
during the campaign for the UK general elections in June 2017. The choice for the UK is 
motivated by its intensive use of crowdfunding relative to the European context, the emphasis 
played by candidates in elections, and the importance of donors and money during campaigns. 
The 2017 UK General Election is a likely environment to observe crowdfunding activity since 
it was a snap election and there was not much time to identify donors prior to campaign. The 
analysis combines qualitative content analysis in the data collection phase (i.e. crowdfunding 
project descriptions, type of language used by candidates to persuade people to donate) with 
statistical analysis to test relationships.  
The first section of this article conceptualises the key terms, reviews the literature, 
builds the analytical framework and formulates two testable hypotheses. Next, we describe 
the methodology, variable operationalisation and the data. The third section includes the 
main results and their interpretation. The conclusions summarise the findings, discuss the 
implications and set avenues for further research.  
 
Concepts, Theory and Hypotheses 
Mollick  argues that most definitions of crowdfunding are too broad and suggests narrowing 
the definition to highlight its entrepreneurial aspects: “crowdfunding refers to the efforts by 
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entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures 
by drawing on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using 
the internet without standard financial intermediaries” (Mollick 2014, p.2).  
As Schlueter (2015, p. 3) explains in his study on entrepreneurial crowdfunding: “in the 
past the idea of crowdfunding was already in usage, however in a slightly differentiated way”.  
The UK Crowdfunding Association broadly defines crowdfunding as “a way of raising finance 
by asking a large number of people each for a small amount of money” (UKFCA, 2017).  There 
are several features that distinguish crowdfunding from other types of online fundraising. One 
aspect is the involvement of the crowd in the “production process” (Belleflamme et al. 2013; 
Byrnes et al. 2014). The donors become investors of a particular good or service and this 
investment is a motivation to further promote the project in their social networks. Social 
media and the crowdfunding platforms are crucial in the entire process (Ordanini et al. 2011; 
Belleflamme et al. 2013; Lu et al. 2014; Mollick 2014; Zheng et al. 2014). Moreover, 
crowdfunding has other roles apart from raising money. First, it illustrates the demand for a 
product or service. Donations can be seen as endorsements and this can potentially attract 
more traditional donors (Mollick 2014). Another difference is the opportunity it gives 
candidates to test and increase their understanding of donors’ opinions and attitudes 
(Belleflamme et al. 2013). Lastly, crowdfunding eliminates certain social and geographical 
constraints fundraisers normally have to deal with, such as traditional gatekeepers. 
Fundraisers have the opportunity to tap into a new public in other geographical areas or 
socioeconomic strata.   
To our knowledge, Sokolov (2015, p.117) was the first to define political crowdfunding 
as “public funding or collective cooperation among large numbers of people who consolidate 
their money or other resources, usually via the Internet, for political projects”. This article 
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follows this conceptualisation of political crowdfunding and combines the perspectives of 
Mollick and Sokolov to define electoral crowdfunding. Accordingly, crowdfunding refers to  
the efforts made by political actors to fund their campaigns by drawing on relatively small online 
contributions from a relatively large number of individuals, without standard financial 
intermediaries or formal requirements (e.g. like the membership fees). The crowdfunding is 
characterized by several elements that separate it from other forms of donations: it is done 
through a recognised platform, there is a fixed target for the amount that is to be raised and this 
target is publicly available. 
 
Creating a new category of crowdfunding raises the question what distinguishes political 
crowdfunding from other forms, such as the popular type of entrepreneurial crowdfunding. 
Song et al (2015) define four categories of crowdfunding: equity-based, lending-based, 
reward-based and donation-based crowdfunding. The difference between donation-based 
crowdfunding and the other types, is that there are no selective benefits; the donor does not 
get anything in return for the gift, in the case of political crowdfunding not even the certainty 
of helping the right person or party into power. Therefore, we would like to argue that political 
crowdfunding falls into the last category. 
There is a thin but important line between donating online and political crowdfunding. 
The observation by Crowdexpert (2014) according to which the magic of crowdfunding is that 
it merges political campaigning and fundraising within one platform, comes closest to 
explaining the difference between the two. We argue that three factors distinguish political 
crowdfunding from online political fundraising: 1) the platform that is used during 
crowdfunding is mostly non-political, creating a sense of neutrality; 2) other than a campaign 
website, the main feature of a crowdfunding platform is its connectivity to social media. There 
is an easy link between the social media channels of the candidate or party, and the 
crowdfunding campaign. A side-effect of this could possibly be that the crowdfunding 
campaign reaches a broader public than another political fundraising campaign would have 
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done; 3) there is a clear competitive aspect to crowdfunding that is not present at individual 
fundraising websites, namely the fact that one can easily compare the success of one 
crowdfunding campaign to other campaigns.  
 
Campaign finance in the UK 
In the UK, parties receive comparatively little financial support from the central government. 
In most cases, if parties are eligible for government funding, the amounts are based on the 
number of seats the party has in the House of Commons. Therefore, the system strongly 
benefits the bigger parties (Democratic Audit, 2010). As for fundraising, research has shown 
that donations to and money raised by British parties have increased each year (Johnston & 
Pattie, 2014). As a result of the professionalisation of political campaigns, election spending 
has also increased heavily (Democratic Audit, 2010). Traditionally, the Conservatives and 
Labour could rely on a loyal group of financial backers, but more recently parties have started 
to rely on a few very generous donors and many smaller donations from members and 
supporters (Johnston & Pattie 2014). As for the smaller parties, they have never been in this 
favourable position and therefore rely more heavily on their members. Yet, party membership 
has been declining steadily over the past years (Bennett, 2016), making it difficult for the 
smaller parties to stay afloat (Democratic Audit, 2010). In 2016, the total income of the Labour 
Party was about 24 times higher than that of the Greens. The total income of the 
Conservatives was about 17 times higher than that of the SNP (Electoral Commission, 2018), 
showing the large discrepancy in financial resources between the large and smaller parties. 
Until recently, British parties did not use the Internet as a relevant fundraising tool, with most 
parties only placing a “donate” button on their websites (Anstead 2008). However, as a result 
of the above mentioned changes and financial pressures, an increasing number of political 
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parties and candidates shifted attention towards the Internet and online fundraising 
campaigns. 
 
Negativity, Competitiveness and Incumbency 
Earlier research suggests that different types of crowdfunding require different strategies 
(Stauch 2011; Stiver et al. 2015). Similar to other types of political donations, those who 
donate to crowdfunding have more resources available than the average citizen. Research on 
the crowdfunding supporters for a project on deliberative democracy in Belgium indicates that 
most donors were highly educated, more often male than female and already  politically active 
(Jacquet & Reuchamps 2016). Similarly, political donors have strong political viewpoints, are 
generally richer, older and highly educated compared to those who do not (Hill & Huber 2017). 
Since vpeople with these characterstics are more prone to donate, they also receive more 
requests for donations (Hassell & Monson 2014). Donating to a political campaign is different 
from making a regular purchase as the outcome is uncertain. Therefore, donating money to a 
political cause is comparable to a gamble and wealthy donors will make a critical evaluation 
before they decide to support a cause (Johnston & Pattie 2014).  
There is less research on how people can be motivated to donate to crowdfunding 
campaigns for an election. Due to the scarce research on the topic, the causal mechanisms are 
inspired from two bodies of literature: negative campaigning and the incumbency advantage.  
Our first argument is that negative campaigning can enhance the willingness of people to 
contribute. There are good reasons to expect that a candidate’s aggressive rhetoric towards 
their opponents will generate higher contributions. This idea has been examined by earlier 
research outside the field of politics. Two studies investigating the crowdfunding platform 
Kickstarter illustrate that language is an important predictor of a successfully funded 
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crowdfunding campaign (Mitra & Gilbert 2014; Chung & Lee 2015). In politics, previous studies 
emphasised the need for a good communication strategy to persuade people to donate. A 
study about the messages used in political fundraising e-mails identified three types of appeals 
made by political actors to convince people to donate: solidary (referred to all the others who 
had already donated), material (if the donors received something in return for their donation) 
and ideological (Hassell & Monson 2014). Research on donations to charities claims that the 
best way to attract donors to campaigns is either to combine factual abstract information with 
a negative message or a story with a positive message. The authors identified three key 
elements that convince the potential donors: message framing (positive or negative), 
evidence and the probability that the end goal will be achieved (Das et al. 2008). 
We further elaborate this argument about the use of language in fundraising for 
electoral campaigns and focus on the potential effects of negative and competitor message 
frames. Negativism during electoral campaigns can be defined as the act of communication 
that contains a direct, personal and voluntary attack against political opponents 
(Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Lau & Pomper 2002). Different scholars have looked at the 
mobilisation effects of the use of negativity in political campaigns. Quite a few studies show 
that, while their impact on voting behaviour are contradictory (for an extensive review, see 
Nai 2013), negative messages have a relevant impact on people’s attitudes. A study examining 
the news framing of the 2004 European Union enlargement in terms of risk and opportunity 
concluded that the more negative frame of risk lowered the level of support for enlargement. 
This effect was moderated by political knowledge where those individuals with less knowledge 
were more affected by negativity (Schuck & De Vreese 2006). Conflict framing used during the 
campaign for the 2009 European parliamentary elections mobilised people to vote. In this 
context negativity had an impact on behaviour (Schuck et al. 2016). A meta-analysis of studies 
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about the effects of negative campaigning shows that while it does not win votes, it is more 
memorable and stimulates knowledge about the campaign (Lau et al. 2007). Negative 
discourse may draw the public’s attention to issues and may be transformed by citizens into 
useful source of information. Consequently, it increases the saliency of particular issues for 
citizens (Freedman & Goldstein 1999; Martin 2004).  
These are the two general mechanisms that we also expect to see at work when 
negative frames are used in crowdfunding. These are the negative and competitor framing. 
To begin with the negative framing, the attacks directed at political opponents will catch the 
eye of the public to the fundraising campaign and will make it more memorable. This way, the 
ads will not be short-lived and will stick to the mind of the people who will be able to associate 
the call for donations with an aggressive discourse. This all goes in the direction of a negativity 
bias in which negative information triggers stronger emotional reactions compared to positive 
or neutral information. People devote more time and energy to think about bad as opposed 
to good things (Brader 2006; Soroka & McAdams 2010; Nai 2013). In brief, candidates who 
use negative frames to promote their crowdfunding projects during electoral campaigns are 
more likely to draw the public’s attention and increase their likelihood to donate.  
Competitor messages are those in which the candidates portray themselves as 
competitors and draw the attention to themselves. The effect of the competitor framing 
works according to a different logic. Earlier research showed that there are instances in which 
negative messages may not work. For example, Barton et al. (2016) found that negative 
messages were not more effective than positive messages when used in political fundraising. 
That is why we argue that competitor messages will boost the chances of candidates receiving 
donations. The use of competitive message frames in electoral campaigns can significantly 
increase the amount raised by the campaign (Barton et al. 2016).  
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A review of the literature on the incumbency advantage leads to the expectation that 
incumbency status will matter for the amount a candidate raises through crowdfunding. 
Incumbents have several advantages over challengers: the enjoy free publicity due to their 
position in office and familiarity with the press.  They have access to resources such as travel 
funds to visit their constituency and thus increase their visibility and recognisability, They have 
the time and tools to build a credible image of authority and professionalism, and are usually 
more successful in fundraising efforts (Abramowitz 1991; Squire 1991; Benoit & Marsh 2008; 
Smith 2013; Gherghina 2014). Krebs (2001) refers to political fundraising as an “insider’s 
game” in which incumbents enjoy obvious advantages and challengers can only succeed by 
developing ties with other powerful players in the political field. An analysis of elections for 
the US Supreme Court between 1990 and 2000 found that incumbents managed to raise more 
money, although it was the quality of the candidate that mattered most (Bonneau 2007). 
Challengers have a major disadvantage in political fundraising because they are seen as 
outsiders (Stauch 2011, p.196). Although challengers can raise equal amounts of money 
during their campaign, they will have to work harder to reach these levels  than the 
incumbent. In this sense, incumbents are more reliable in the context of their experience and 
expertise in office.  
Following these arguments in the literature we expect that: 
H1: Candidates who apply negative and/or competitor frames to their messages about 
crowdfunding projects are more likely to reach their donation target. 
H2: Incumbents are more likely to reach their donation target. 
 
One could argue that there may be a case for omitted variable bias or endogeneity with the 
two hypothesized effects. First, the omitted variable bias could occur for H1 if the underdog 
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status of candidates could explain the variation in the percent of target collected. According 
to this logic, they use negative messages more than the incumbents and pursue low collection 
targets because for them every pound counts. This could be true if the initial assumption that 
underdogs use negative campaigning more than other candidates. That is no longer the case, 
as illustrated in a broad range of studies. Also, as revealed by our analysis, the correlation 
between incumbency and projected targets is -0.03, which is practically statistical 
independence indicating that those who are in office do not set higher targets compared to 
underdogs. As such, being an underdog does not influence how high the candidates aim.  
Second, the endogeneity argument is based  on the assumption that candidates who 
strive for more money set unrealistic targets. If that happens, we could have the same 
determinants for the projected targets and amounts raised. Such an interpretation does not 
hold for theoretical and empirical reasons. In theory, there is little logical connection between 
all the independent variables in this article – including the controls – and the decision about 
the targets. The latter are more likely the result of strategic thinking that takes into account a 
cost-benefit analysis and factors that are not included in this analysis. There are advantages 
and disadvantages in setting up targets and the decision belongs to the candidates. Low 
targets could be an advantage to them because they are realistic, but they may also be a 
disadvantage because they lack resources in campaign. High targets have advantages (will 
provide more resources) and disadvantages (hard to reach and thus shed a negative light on 
them for not achieving an objective). Candidates weigh these against each other and factor in 
a series of other variables such as support received from their parties, experience with 
fundraising in the past etc.  
The empirical analysis conducted with the data collected for this article backs up this 
interpretation. The direction and size of the correlation coefficients is different: for percent of 
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target raised the highest correlates are the use of frames, political party, incumbency and 
constituency size (Table 1), while for projected targets the highest correlates are the number 
of updates (0.27) and use of social media (0.12).  
 
Controls 
In addition to these two main effects, a number of variables were identified in the literature 
with potential impact on the crowdfunding campaigns.1 The first control variable is the 
targeted amount because this can influence reaching the proposed target. There are reasons 
to expect that targets could influence the goal achievement (e.g. targeted amount at the 
beginning). However, this effect can go in either direction. A low target may enhance 
donations since people feel that every bit counts and they can see how their money can 
substantially contribute to the candidate’s campaign. A small target may be easier to achieve 
and additional donations on top of the target may be seen as bonuses. High targets may also 
trigger important donations since people see that the candidate aims high. Hard to reach 
targets can send mobilising stimuli to the electorate.  
The amount of regular updates is the second control variable since earlier research 
showed that they matter (Panagopoulos 2009). Research on crowdfunding suggests it is 
important to keep the platform “alive” with regular updates because these bring more money 
(Lu et al. 2014; Mitra & Gilbert 2014; Mollick 2014; Zheng et al. 2014; Chung & Lee 2015). At 
the same time, these works indicate that updates are usually one of the three or four key 
variables leading to a successful (in terms of donations) crowdfunding campaign. 
                                                          
1 We also controlled for other variables such as the use of visuals, duration, existence of a website for the 
crowdfunding campaign, and gender. Empirical evidence indicates a very small impact or none and this is the 
reason for which we did not report them.   
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The third control variable is the use of social media,  and posits that an extensive social 
network is a good predictor ofa successful crowdsourcing campaign (Ordanini et al. 2011; 
Belleflamme et al. 2013; Mollick 2014; Zheng et al. 2014). Waddingham (2013) showed that 
the use of Facebook in online fundraising can have a strong positive impact: the sharing of one 
post resulted in an increase of revenues between £1 and £18. Similarly, Chung & Lee (2015) 
illustrated that the use of Twitter to promote crowdfunding campaigns has a positive 
outcome. In their research on crowdfunding projects, Lu et al. (2014) did not find evidence to 
support such a positive correlation.  
The final two control variables are candidates’ party affiliation and constituency size. 
British parties tend to spend more money in constituencies where they have a larger chance 
of winning (Johnston & Pattie 2014). Given this discrepancy in party-sourced money we expect 
variation in the degree to which candidates look for public support to fund their campaign, i.e. 
strongholds vs. competitive constituencies. Moreover, candidates belonging to small parties 
may be more inclined to seek crowdfunding in order to cover their deposit since their chances 
of getting 5% of the vote are limited. Constituency size may matter in two ways. On the one 
hand, the geographical proximity of a crowdfunder to an entrepreneur increases the chances 
that they will  donate to a project (Mollick 2014). In small constituencies the likelihood of such 
personal ties is higher and thus could influence the success of crowdfunding projects, although 
the online environment is likely to break geographical boundaries (Agrawal et al. 2011). On 
the other hand, a large constituency is likely to provide candidates more opportunities to raise 
money through crowdfunding: the targeted population is higher and the individual amounts 





To test the hypotheses, we use candidate level data from a British online platform that covers 
numerous crowdfunding sites (www.crowdfunder.co.uk). The data collection also included 
the candidates’ Facebook and Twitter accounts, and their official campaign websites. The 
platform Crowdfunder has included a special category for political projects and has been used 
extensively during the past two general elections in the UK. A series of features make the UK 
the ideal setting to conduct our study. In Britain, parties receive relatively little financial 
support from the central government. This support is mainly limited to free postage via Royal 
Mail of election material and free air time on radio and TV. In British politics there is also a 
gradual shift from the traditional sources of financial support in the form of large donations 
to smaller donations and fees from members and supporters (Johnston & Pattie 2014). While 
there are limits on the amount political actors can spend during their campaigns, individual 
candidates will almost never spend the maximum amount they are allowed to spend 
(Johnston & Pattie 2014).  
Narrowcasting (strategic targeting) has become an important component of digital 
campaigning. The term ‘analytics turn’ was used to describe the way in which campaign 
managers make use of experimental online methods to test and reach out to the electorate 
(Chadwick & Stromer-Galley 2016). In the UK, the major political parties have databases with 
information about their voters. They use advanced software to find out whom to target 
(Bennett 2016). During the 2015 UK general election, the analytics turn was used by the 
Conservatives to target specific audiences online. The party used Facebook data to reach out 




For the empirical analysis, we focus on a single crowdfunding platform as this makes it 
easier to compare the different candidates. Out of the total number of crowdfunding projects 
by individual candidates running for office during the UK general election in June 2017, we 
randomly selected 100 projects. We came up with this number to accommodate the intensive 
primary data collection for all the variables included in the analysis and the possibility to run 
basic statistical tests. None of the 100 campaigns had any crises, scandals, or other 
extraordinary factors that could foster or impede the fundraising and affect the chances of 
achieving the goals. Our close investigation of these campaigns did not reveal relevant issues 
throughout the fundraising process.   
The large percent of Scottish National Party (SNP) candidates on the platform made 
the sample biased in that direction. We made two minor post-sampling changes: ensuring a 
relatively even geographic distribution (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales) of the 
candidates and increasing political coverage to include candidates from most parties running 
in election. The candidates included in the analysis (Appendix 1) belong to the following 
parties: the Conservatives, Green Party, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the NHA, Plaid Cymru, 
Sinn Fein, the SNP, and independents. The dataset also includes candidates who competed 
against each other in the same constituency. For comparability purposes, we analyse only 
those crowdfunding projects where money was gathered for one politician and not for the 
party. The analysis is quantitative and combines bivariate correlations and OLS regression 





The dependent variable of this study is the percent of donations collected by each candidate 
through crowdfunding relative to their targeted amount.2 Appendix 1 provides an overview 
of the way in which the targeted amounts were distributed as well as the extent to which they 
were fully funded. One would expect that setting a higher target would lead to a lower success 
rate, but the data shows that this is often not the case. We used this relative measurement 
instead of the raw amounts collected through crowdfunding for four reasons: 1) this makes 
the data comparable across constituencies since candidates in larger constituencies collect 
significantly more money than those in smaller constituencies, 2) it has a stable point of 
reference outside the political system, 3) it downplays the effect of visibility in which more 
popular candidates collect more money and 4) it helps control for the realism of candidates’ 
expectations in terms of crowdfunding, i.e. targeted amount.  
The framing of messages (H1) is a count measure that represents the sum of all 
messages using negative or competitor frames, which ranged from 0 to 24 messages 
(Appendix 2). The occurrence of each frame is a dichotomous variable coded 0 if the frame is 
positive or neutral, and 1 when the frame is negative or competitor. Using a qualitative 
content analysis, every project description on the crowdfunding pages was read to identify 
whether they use negative or competitor message frames. A description includes a negative 
message frame when a negative reference was made to another party or candidate, as in this 
example: “At this election, Labour values are once again at stake – threatened by a 
Conservative Party intent on driving through a hard Brexit and doubling down on austerity, 
and a Scottish Nationalist Party that will always place their pursuit of independence above the 
                                                          
2 We ran an analysis with the raw amount collected through crowdfunding as dependent variable. The results 
indicated that these amounts depend heavily on the projected target, i.e. candidates who set high targets work 
harder to achieve them, and size of constituency. The effect of the other variables was fairly similar to what 
presented in the empirical section of this article.  
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needs and aspirations of the people of Scotland” (Crowdfunder, 2017). The author refers to 
two of the largest competing parties - the SNP and the Conservatives to strengthen their own 
credibility. A description was labelled as having a competitor frame when, within the 
description, a reference is made to another candidate. For example: “Conservative David 
Nuttall, is an embarrassment to the constituency of Bury North. Our town deserves better, we 
need an MP who is open and will talk to the people he works for - you!” (Crowdfunder, 2017). 
In general, we observed that whenever negative references were made to parties, the Tories 
were often linked to austerity measures and Brexit, while the SNP to fighting for 
independence. 
The incumbency status of the candidate (H2) is a dichotomous variable where 1 stands 
for incumbent and 0 for challenger. The targeted amount is a straightforward interval ratio 
variable that measures the target set by every candidate at the beginning of the crowdfunding 
campaign. The second control variable, the number of updates on Crowdfunder, is a count 
measure that ranges between 0 and 8 (the maximum number of updates performed by a 
candidate). Links to social media pages are coded on a three-point ordinal scale with values 0 
to 2 corresponding to no link to social media, one link or two links. Crowdfunder allows users 
to embed links to both Facebook and Twitter for each project and that is why we have a 
maximum of two links.3 The party size is coded on a nine-point ordinal scale on the basis of 
the number o seats held by each before the 2017 election, from the largest (the Conservatives, 
code 1) to the smallest and independents (code 9). The constituency size is an interval ratio 
measure that counts the total population within the boundaries of that constituency (House 
of Commons Library 2017). Details about the variable distribution are available in Appendix 2.  
                                                          
3 An alternative to measure the use of social media was the count of posts for every candidate. Since not all 





Figure 1 presents the distribution of revenues, expressed in percent relative to the target, for 
each candidate. The horizontal axis reflects the percent, while each bar on the horizontal axis 
stands for a candidate. The thick lines indicate that more candidates achieved the same 
percent of target. For example, there are six candidates who raised exactly the same as they 
initially planned (100%).The thicker bar in the figure reflects this overlap. The percent of target 
received through Crowdfunder ranges from 3.4% in the case of Claire Edwards (Labour), who 
planned for £20,000 and raised only £685, to 783.9% in the case of Blair McDougall (Labour) 
who targeted £1,000 and collected £7,839. More than half of all projects were fully funded 
and about one fifth of all projects received double the amount of funding they had aimed for. 
 

































Table 1 includes the results of the bivariate analysis. There is empirical support for both 
hypothesised relationships. The correlation coefficient of 0.32 (statistically significant at the 
0.01 level) for the use of frames (H1) indicates a positive correlation between the use of 
negative and competitor frames in the project descriptions and the percent of target collected 
by candidates through crowdfunding relative to their target. Candidates who used negative 
and competitor frames in their project descriptions are more likely to (over)perform in 
crowdfunding. By looking at examples of projects where a high number of frames was 
identified, one can find some nuances regarding the added value of negative and competitor 
frames for political crowdfunding. Those who scored highest on the use of frames did not 
always manage to reach their target. The Labour candidate James Frith, for example, seeks to 
promote his candidacy almost solely by referring to his competitor and by summing up the 
latter’s track record: “Rather than host surgeries, helping those in Bury North who need it 
most during the week, David Nuttall instead is often found in Westminster, speaking verbosely 
at length, talking down decent policies (usually on social justice) put forward by other elected 
representatives” (Crowdfunder, 2017). Despite using a large number of negative and 
competitor frames , Frith only managed to achieve 50.6% of his target.  
In contrast, the Labour candidate Blair McDougall multiplied his initial target of £1,000 
by 793,9%, which makes his project the most successful of those studied. McDougall used a 
mix of positive and competitive frames, such as in this paragraph: “I want to be a campaigning 
local MP focussed on making our home better rather than on dividing us from our neighbours. 
I won't go to Westminster to back a hard Brexit or to cheerlead for independence” 
(Crowdfunder, 2017). Another example is Tommy Sheppard, an SNP candidate. Although he 
used an average number of negative and competitor frames, he managed to over-perform by 
270% relative to his initial target.  
20 
 
Incumbents (H2) on average were more successful in reaching their targets than the 
challengers. Although the correlation is not very strong (0.19, statistically significant at the 0.1 
level), it shows support for the hypothesised relationship about the so-called incumbency 
advantage. Out of a total of 37 incumbents included in the sample, 78% reached their funding 
target. For all of the 63 challengers, this number was considerably lower and slightly more 
than half did so (51%).  
 
Table 1: The Correlation and Regression (OLS) Analyses for the Percent of Target Collected (N=100) 
 Correlation Regression (OLS) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 
Use of frames  0.32*** 0.32*** (2.98) 0.29*** (3.23) 
Incumbency 0.19* 0.19** (22.69) 0.15 (26.50) 
Projected target -0.23**  -0.28*** (0.01) 
Number of updates 0.10  0.10 (11.21) 
Use of social media 0.10  0.08 (13.04) 
Party seat share -0.20*  -0.02 (5.83) 
Size of constituency -0.19*  -0.06 (0.01) 
R2  0.14 0.22 
Notes:  For regressions the presented coefficients are standardised (beta). Standard errors in  
parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Thus setting targets appears to affect the degree to which the candidates reach this target. 
The targets set by each candidate varied greatly, from £500 to £20,000. The correlation 
coefficient (-0.23, statistically significant at 0.05) indicates that those who had a lower target 
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were on average more successful in reaching it compared to those with high targets. 
Candidates belonging to smaller parties (correlation coefficient -0.20, significant at 0.1) are 
more likely to reach their projected targets through crowdfunding. This result is partially 
driven by the large share of SNP candidates in the sample and by those candidates who seek 
crowdfunding to cover their deposit since they had no chance of reaching 5% of the vote (e.g. 
the Greens, the Independents); the latter have stronger motivations than the rest to actively 
strive for more money. However, this relationship disappears in the regression analysis (as 
explained below). The correlation coefficient (-0.19, significant at 0.1) indicates that, on 
average, candidates in smaller constituencies reached their projected targets more often than 
the candidates in large constituencies. 
A weaker positive correlation could be observed between the number of updates and 
the percent of target collected (0.10, not significant). One explanation for this outcome might 
be that many of the surveyed candidates did not update their projects on a regular basis and 
thus there was little variation in the number of updates. In practice, social media was used to 
provide updates about the success of the crowdfunding. Many candidates used Facebook and 
Twitter for a countdown of the project, providing updates on the funded amount. One 
example is the Labour candidate Amjal Masroor. In total, he mentioned Crowdfunder 27 times 
on his social media pages to keep his supporters updated on its progress. For example, on May 
22, he tweeted the following: “Just £285 will help us reach £3000 towards my electoral 
campaign. Please donate whatever you can today to help us reach this target. Jzk” (Twitter, 
2017). In spite of this observation, the correlation between the use of social media and 
percent of target is quite weak, but positive (0.10, not significant).   
The multivariate regression analysis confirms and strengthens the conclusions of the 
bivariate correlations. We run two separate models, with and without controls, to see the 
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extent to which each variable explains the variance of the percent of target raised through 
crowdfunding. The first model includes solely the hypothesised effect and it explains 14% of 
the variation in the dependent variable. As also indicated by the correlation coefficient, the 
stronger predictor is the use of frames by the candidates (H1) when compared to incumbency 
(H2). The standardised regression coefficients have the same value with the correlation 
coefficient, the only difference appears with respect to the level of significance for 
incumbency which increases in the regression to 0.05.  
Figure 2 presents the positive effect of frames and incumbency on the percent of target 
raised. In both cases, the percent of target reached goes up when the use of frames increases 
and when moving from a challenger to an incumbent. The slope is steeper and the confidence 
interval is narrower for the use of frames. Both observations coincide with the higher value of 
the regression and correlation coefficient when compared to that of incumbents.  
 
Figure 2: The Effect of Frames and Incumbency on the Percent of Target Collected  
  
The second model shows the effects on the dependent variable when the control variables 
are added. The explanatory power of the model increases to 22%, but the standardized 
regression coefficients indicates some slight alterations of the magnitude of the effects and 
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hypothesised relationships with the use of frames bearing a considerably higher explanatory 
power. Incumbency is no longer statistical significant aftern introducing the control variables, 
but its strength remains similar to the one in Model 1. Among the control variables, the target 
set by candidates has a good explanatory power (statistical significant at 0.01) indicating that 
lower targets helped candidates to reach them. In other words, on average, candidates who 
were modest (or realist) about the crowdfunding revenues came closer to achieving their goal. 
The size of the coefficient is fairly similar to that of frames used by candidates and stronger 
than the effect of incumbency.  
All other controls correlate weakly – as it is the case for updates and the use of social 
media – or very weakly as it happens with the party and constituency size. The regression 
coefficients for updates and social media mirror closely the values of the correlations. The 
regression coefficients for party and constituency sink to very low values, almost indicating 
statistical independence (e.g. the coefficient for party is -0.02 in the regression analysis). This 
weak effect could be due to the fact that the explanatory power loads on other features that 
candidates display. For example, the SNP candidates made greater use of frames, which is the 
strongest predictor in the model compared to the Conservative or Labour candidates. Another 
example is the use of social media in which the independents and SNP candidates performed 
highly compared to candidates belonging to larger political parties. The same holds true for 
constituency size, which overlaps with incumbency and frames. Some of the candidates 
running in small constituencies are either incumbents and / or use negative and competitor 





This article analysed 100 political crowdfunding projects during the 2017 UK general election 
campaign to explain the variation in achieving the donation target. Using insights from 
literature on election campaigning, we argued that two main determinants are likely to play 
an important role: the use of negative and competitor frames and the incumbency status. The 
empirical evidence provides support for both hypothesised relationships. Negative and 
competitor message frames have a positive effect on the percent of target reached through 
crowdfunding. The candidates who pursued attacks against their opponents in the 
constituency and / or referred more broadly to the competition environment resonated more 
with potential donors. Incumbency appears to be a good indicator of successful crowdfunding 
campaigns. Overall candidates who occupy office reached their projected target to a greater 
extent than challengers. This reveals the existence of an incumbency advantage in terms of 
funding. Among others, incumbents are more familiar with the press and constituents, they 
have higher visibility, possess experience in office and all these advantages are also reflected 
in the collected amounts.  
In addition to its theoretical contributions, the analysis highlighted an important 
determinant that may be helpful for future campaigns.  Candidates who set lower targets, 
either from modesty or based on realism, were more likely to perform better. Both candidates 
and citizens mobilise better when they had an achievable target. In the UK context, these 
findings make an important contribution to the understanding of the party politics dynamics 
by revealing a new model of campaign funding. If the Conservatives have traditionally been 
backed by capital and Labour with resources provided by the Trade Union movement, our 
findings reveal that the SNP focuses on different sources of financial support. Its recourse to 
ordinary citizens for crowdfunding during campaigns is in line with the effective network built 
around and following the 2014 Independence Referendum.  
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The implications of this analysis reach beyond the analysed case study. At a theoretical 
level, it shows that the outcome of a crowdfunding campaign is driven by the same 
mechanisms as every electoral campaign. More precisely, the aggressive messages used to 
increase voter share may also be used in political fundraising. This result confirms the 
arguments of those theories advocating the role and use of negative campaigning in an 
election. Furthermore, this study has found that the incumbency advantage holds also when 
referring to political crowdfunding. The theoretical expectations that incumbents are better 
positioned in an electoral campaign are thus supported outside the realm of votes where it 
has been investigated until recently. At methodological level, the model we propose to 
analyse crowdfunding campaigns is not context specific and can travel across countries. Our 
models include the most significant variables to be considered and all of them can be easily 
collected from crowdfunding websites since they all have similar formats.  
These findings invite further research that could substantiate our observations. One 
possible direction is an in-depth scrutiny of how and why candidates use crowdfunding and, 
more broadly, how this fits into particular fundraising systems. Other studies could expand 
upon the findings in this study. For example, we showed that targets may have a psychological 
effect both for candidates and donors.  It is important to better understand how these targets 
are calculated and if there is a strategy involved when taking a decision about them. Finally, 
due to time and data availability constraints, our analysis was limited to 100 candidates. 
Future studies could expand the sample and even look at different electoral contexts to 
provide comparable results. One particular avenue for further research is an analysis of how 
crowdfunding contributes to the general picture of fundraising in electoral campaigns. As 
such, it would be relevant to investigate the extent to which the candidates raise money from 
small donors through crowdfunding in addition to other means. A longitudinal comparison 
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with previous campaigns would help assess whether candidates – across parties and within 
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Appendix 1: The List of Candidates, their Target and Amount collected through Crowdfunding 
Candidate (surname, first name) Party Funding target (£) Amount funded (£) 
Ahmed-Sheikh, Tasmina SNP 1000 2961 
Antoniazzi, Tonia Labour 3000 2630 
Bardell, Hannah SNP 5000 1915 
Belfitt, Nick LibDem 1800 1863 
Bennett, Natalie Greens 10000 6362 
Black, Mhairi SNP 3000 7980 
Blackford, Ian SNP 3000 4395 
Blackman, Kirsty SNP 2000 2505 
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Boswell, Philip SNP 3000 1450 
Brett, Miriam SNP 3000 5355 
Brock, Deidre SNP 3000 4610 
Brown, Alan SNP 2000 2008 
Calverley, Sally Greens 8000 1580 
Cameron, Lisa SNP 2000 841 
Chapman, Douglas SNP 1000 1363 
Cherry, Joana SNP 1500 8208 
Chilvers, Jonathan Greens 1500 1589 
Choudhury, Foysol Labour 5000 1260 
Chowns, Ellie Greens 500 1310 
Clark, April Greens 750 885 
Coevorden van, Adam Greens 1000 415 
Cooper, Andrew Greens 2000 600 
Cowan, Ronnie SNP 2000 2000 
Davidson, Dehenna Conservatives 5000 520 
De Whalley, Michael Greens 1000 1096 
Dixon, Andy Indep 2500 750 
Dodd, Philip Greens 500 555 
Donaldson, Stuart SNP 2000 4045 
Eadie, Jim SNP 1500 1845 
Easton, Fay Indep 1500 1500 
Edwards, Claire Labour 20,000 685 
Essex, Jonathan Greens 1400 430 
Field, Eleanor Greens 3000 3050 
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Fletcher, Ben Greens 1000 2060 
Francis, Jarelle Greens 2000 660 
Frith, James Labour 5000 2528 
Gethins, Stephen SNP 3000 3620 
Gibson, Patricia SNP 2500 1265 
Gill, Preet Labour 5000 2530 
Giugliano, Toni SNP 1500 3930 
Grady, Patrick SNP 3000 3188 
Griffiths, Nicole Greens 1000 835 
Harper, Carrie  Plaid Cymru 500 500 
Harvie, Patrick Greens 4000 7604 
Hasnain, Gulnar Greens 1000 1300 
Hendry, Drew SNP 3000 3140 
Hill, Alasdair LibDem 1000 575 
Hilland, Andrew Labour 3000 4029 
Irvine, Louise NHA 12,000 35,295 
Johannessen, Kizzi Greens 500 815 
Katz, Mike Labour 3000 2390 
Keeble, Sally Labour 1000 1190 
Kerevan, George SNP 1500 1620 
Kerr, Calum SNP 3000 4520 
Knight, Ricky Greens 1000 1060 
Lasko, Claire Greens 1000 770 
Lawson, Doug Greens 500 715 
Leicester, Philip Greens 2000 520 
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Linden, David SNP 2000 2090 
Loryman, Ben Greens 1500 425 
Lury, Rebecca Labour 2000 520 
Marshall, Peter Indep 8000 1440 
Masroor, Amjal Indep 16,000 2955 
McAllan, Mairi SNP 2500 6845 
McCaig, Callum SNP 3000 5180 
McCluskey, Martin Labour 2000 3250 
McDonald, Stewart SNP 2000 2291 
McDougall, Blair Labour 1000 7839 
Monaghan, Carol SNP 1500 1762 
Murray, Ian Labour 2000 8655 
Newlands, Gavin SNP 3500 3570 
Nicolson, John SNP 10,000 7905 
Nix, Rashid Greens 1000 1000 
O'Dowd, John Sinn Féin 1000 405 
O'Hara, Brendan SNP 4000 3079 
Oswald, Kirsten SNP 2500 3990 
Paterson, Steven SNP 2100 3000 
Rennie, Morvern Greens 1200 965 
Robertson, Angus SNP 1500 7710 
Rowley, Danielle Labour 500 550 
Russell, Caroline Greens 1000 1002 
Saggers, Simon Greens 500 620 
Salmond, Alex SNP 5000 5445 
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Sanderson, Paul Indep 14,000 2080 
Shanks, Michael Labour 1000 1000 
Sheppard, Tommy SNP 1500 4050 
Slater, Lorna Greens 1000 2000 
Snedker, Matthew Greens 2000 805 
Stephens, Chris SNP 1500 1120 
Sweeney, Paul Labour 3000 750 
Taylor, Alison  Labour 1000 750 
Thewliss, Alison SNP 2500 2840 
Thompson, Owen SNP 1000 1000 
Tuckwood, Stuart Greens 3000 2441 
Walker, Carl NHA 1000 925 
Warman, Matt Conservatives 5000 910 
Watson, Kate Labour 1000 2810 
Whitfield, Martin Labour 2000 3071 
Whitford, Philippa SNP 3000 3020 
Wolfson, Rhea Labour 1500 860 
 
 
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables Included in the Analysis 





DV 125.94 3.40 783.90 116.76 
Use of frames  2.69 0 24 3.70 
Incumbency 0.37 0 1 0.48 
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Projected target 2877.50 500 20000 3211.19 
Number of updates 0.31 0 8 1.07 
Use of social media 1.41 0 2 0.87 
Party seat share 4.40 1 9 2.33 






Abramowitz, A.I., 1991. Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in 
U.S. House Elections. The Journal of Politics, 53(1), pp.34–56. 
Agrawal, A.K., Catalini, C. & Goldfarb, A., 2011. The Geography of Crowdfunding, 
Ansolabehere, S. et al., 1994. Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?. American 
Political Science Review, 88(4), pp.829–838. 
Anstead, N., 2008. The Internet and Campaign Finance in the U.S. and the UK: An Institutional 
Comparison. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 5(3), pp.285–302. 
Barton, J., Castillo, M. & Petrie, R., 2016. Negative campaigning, fundraising, and voter 
turnout: A field experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 121, pp.99–
113. 
Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T. & Schwienbacher, A., 2013. Individual crowdfunding practices. 
Venture Capital, 15(4), pp.313–333. 
Bennett, C.J., 2016. Voter databases, micro-targeting, and data protection law: can political 
parties campaign in Europe as they do in North America? International Data Privacy Law, 
6(4), pp.261–275. 
Benoit, K. & Marsh, M., 2008. The Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the 
Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent Spending. American Journal of Political Science, 52(4), 
pp.874–890. 
Bonneau, C.W., 2007. Campaign Fundraising in State Supreme Court Elections. Social Science 
Quarterly, 88(1), pp.68–85. 
Boulianne, S., 2009. Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of Research. 
Political Communication, 26(2), pp.193–211. 
Brader, T., 2006. Campaigning of Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads 
Work, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Byrnes, J.E.K. et al., 2014. To Crowdfund Research, Scientists Must Build an Audience for Their 
Work. PLoS ONE, 9(12), pp.1–29. 
Chadwick, A. & Stromer-Galley, J., 2016. Digital Media, Power, and Democracy in Parties and 
Election Campaigns. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 21(3), pp.283–293. 
Chung, J. & Lee, K., 2015. A Long-Term Study of a Crowdfunding Platform: Predicting Project 
Success and Fundraising Amount. In Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on 
Hypertext & Social Media. pp. 211–220. 
Das, E., Kerkhof, P. & Kuiper, J., 2008. Improving the Effectiveness of Fundraising Messages: 
The Impact of Charity Goal Attainment, Message Framing, and Evidence on Persuasion. 
Journal of Applied Communication Research, 36(2), pp.161–175. 
Dushnitsky, G. et al., 2016. Crowdfunding in Europe: Determinants of Platform Creation across 
Countries. California Management Review, 58(2), pp.44–71. 
Freedman, P. & Goldstein, K., 1999. Measuring Media Exposure and the Effects of Negative 
Campaign Ads. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), pp.1189–1208. 
Gerber, E.M. & Hui, J., 2013. Crowdfunding: Motivations and deterrents for participation. ACM 
Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, 20(6), pp.1–34. 
Gherghina, S., 2014. Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Enhancing Voter Loyalty, London: Routledge. 
Greenberg, J. & Mollick, E., 2017. Activist Choice Homophily and the Crowdfunding of Female 
Founders. Administrative Science Quarterly, 62(2), pp.341–374. 
Hassell, H.J.G., 2011. Looking Beyond the Voting Constituency: A Study of Campaign Donation 
Solicitations in the 2008 Presidential Primary and General Election. Journal of Political 
33 
 
Marketing, 10(1–2), pp.27–42. 
Hassell, H.J.G. & Monson, J.Q., 2014. Campaign Targets and Messages in Direct Mail 
Fundraising. Political Behavior, 36(2), pp.359–376. 
Hill, S.J. & Huber, G.A., 2017. Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary 
Donorate: Results from Merged Survey and Administrative Records. Political Behavior, 
39(1), pp.3–29. 
House of Commons Library, 2017. Collection of constituency data, available at 
https://public.tableau.com/profile/house.of.commons.library.statistics#!/vizhome/Pop
ulationbyage_0/Dataconstituencyincontext, last accessed 22 July 2017.  
Jacquet, V. & Reuchamps, M., 2016. Who wants to pay for deliberative democracy? The 
crowdfunders of the G1000 in Belgium. European Political Science Review, (online first), 
pp.1–21. 
Johnston, R. & Pattie, C., 2014. Money and Electoral Politics: Local Parties and Funding at 
General Elections, Bristol: Policy Press. 
Krebs, T.B., 2001. Political Experience and Fundraising in City Council Elections. Social Science 
Quarterly, 82(3), pp.536–551. 
Lau, R.R. & Pomper, G.M., 2002. Effectiveness of Negative Campaigning in U.S. Senate 
Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1), pp.47–66. 
Lau, R.R., Sigelman, L. & Rovner, I.B., 2007. The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A 
Meta-Analytic Reassessment. The Journal of Politics, 69(4), pp.1176–1209. 
Lu, C.-T. et al., 2014. Inferring the impacts of social media on crowdfunding. In Proceedings of 
the 7th ACM international conference on Web search and data mining. pp. 573–582. 
Martin, P.S., 2004. Inside the Black Box of Negative Campaign Effects: Three Reasons Why 
Negative Campaigns Mobilize. Political Psychology, 25(4), pp.545–562. 
Milligan, K. & Rekkas, M., 2008. Campaign Spending Limits, Incumbent Spending, and Election 
Outcomes. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d’Economique, 41(4), 
pp.1351–1374. 
Mitra, T. & Gilbert, E., 2014. The language that gets people to give: phrases that predict 
success on kickstarter. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer 
supported cooperative work & social computing. pp. 49–61. 
Mollick, E., 2014. The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 29(1), pp.1–16. 
Nai, A., 2013. What really matters is which camp goes dirty: Differential effects of negative 
campaigning on turnout during Swiss federal ballots. European Journal of Political 
Research, 52(1), pp.44–70. 
Ordanini, A. et al., 2011. Crowd-funding: transforming customers into investors through 
innovative service platforms. Journal of Service Management, 22(4), pp.443–470. 
Panagopoulos, C. ed., 2009. Politicking Online: The Transformation of Election Campaign 
Communications, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Schuck, A.R.T., Vliegenthart, R. & De Vreese, C.H., 2016. Who’s Afraid of Conflict? The 
Mobilizing Effect of Conflict Framing in Campaign News. British Journal of Political 
Science, 46(1), pp.177–194. 
Schuck, A.R.T. & De Vreese, C.H., 2006. Between Risk and Opportunity: News Framing and its 
Effects on Public Support for EU Enlargement. European Journal of Communication, 21(1), 
pp.5–32. 
Smith, T.H., 2013. Are you sitting comfortably? Estimating incumbency advantage in the UK: 
1983–2010 – A research note. Electoral Studies, 32(1), pp.167–173. 
34 
 
Sokolov, A. V., 2015. Russian Political Crowdfunding. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-
Soviet Democratization, 23(2), pp.117–149. 
Soroka, S. & McAdams, S., 2010. An Experimental Study of the Differential Effects ofPositive 
versus Negative News Content, Available at: http://patrick-fournier.com/d/cours11-
6607.pdf. 
Squire, P., 1991. Preemptive Fund-Raising and Challenger Profile in Senate Elections. The 
Journal of Politics, 53(4), pp.1150–1164. 
Stauch, J., 2011. Effective Frontline Fundraising. A Guide for Nonprofits, Political Candidates, 
and Advocacy Groups, New York: Apress. 
Stiver, A. et al., 2015. Civic crowdfunding: how do offline communities engage online? In 
Proceedings of the 2015 British HCI Conference. pp. 37–45. 
Waddingham, J., 2013. The future of Facebook fundraising. International Journal of Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 18(3), pp.187–191. 
Zheng, H. et al., 2014. The role of multidimensional social capital in crowdfunding: A 
comparative study in China and US. Information & Management, 51(4), pp.488–496. 
 
 
 
